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The Antitrust Implications of the Denial of
Hospital Staff Privileges
WILLiAM R. DRXL*
Hospitals monitor the quality of patient care by control-
ling physician access to hospitals and their facilities. Physi-
cians denied staff privileges may claim that the hospital's limi-
tation on access represents a concerted refusal to deal-a
violation of the Sherman Act. In this article, the author exam-
ines the allegedly anticompetitive practices of hospitals and
concludes that the hospitals' concerted refusal to deal may be
permitted as a legitimate means of self-regulation by
professionals.
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1. INTRODUCTION
The medical profession has become increasingly sophisticated.
Technological advances have spawned an impressive array of new
diagnostic and therapeutic devices. Because of its high cost, such
equipment is not, however, economically feasible for office use. Ac-
cess to hospital facilities has thus become essential to the practic-
ing physician.'
Concomitantly, hospitals have become more restrictive in
granting staff privileges to physicians. Rather than being consid-
ered as mere providers of health care facilities, hospitals have be-
come viewed as actual providers of health care. This changing im-
* Associate with Shughart, Thomson & Kilroy, Kansas City, Missouri; B.A., J.D.,
Creighton University; LL.M., University of Michigan.
1. See Cray, Due Process Considerations in Hospital Staff Privilege Cases, 7 HASTINGS
CONST. L.Q. 217, 217 (1979).
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age has led to the imposition of legal liability upon hospitals for
the actions of their medical staffs.' Hospitals accordingly scrutinize
more closely the qualifications of new applicants for staff positions
and the competence of existing staff members as a means of avoid-
ing future legal liability. This selectivity often leads to legal con-
flicts between physicians and hospitals.8
Traditionally, physicians who felt that they were wrongfully
denied staff privileges brought suits against the offending hospi-
tals, alleging that they had been denied procedural due process.
Recently, however, physicians have turned increasingly to the anti-
trust laws to redress their grievances. This trend is due largely to
substantive developments in antitrust law and procedural due
process.4
Early decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States'
exempted "learned professions", such as medicine, from antitrust
laws because they were not a "trade" as defined in section 1 of the
Sherman Antitrust Act.6 Any such learned profession exemption
clearly has been rejected by recent Supreme Court decisions. The
2. See Darling v. Charleston Community Memorial Hosp., 33 Ill. 2d 326, 333, 211
N.E.2d 253, 258 (1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 946 (1966) (jury may find that hospital's
failure to review staff competence constitutes negligence). For an explanation of the devel-
opment of hospital liability, see Hanson & Stromberg, Hospital Liability for Negligence, 21
HASTINGs L.J. 1, 6-14 (1969); Walkup & Kelly, Hospital Liability: Changing Patterns of
Responsibility, 8 U.S.F. L. Rav. 247, 254-57 (1973).
3. A recent decision succinctly stated the tension between the interests of the hospital
and the physician:
On the one hand, the public must be assured that each member of the medical
staff of a hospital is fully competent to practice his profession at such facility; on
the other hand, every effort must be made to insure that no physician will be
denied staff-privileges on the basis of incorrect information or without having
been afforded a meaningful opportunity to refute the charges against him. Each
decision must be made with the best interest of the hospital in mind but with a
full recognition of the rights of the individual physician. The termination of a
physician's staff-privileges is serious business; a single precipitous decision of a
medical committee could ruin a budding career.
Early v. Bristol Memorial Hosp., 508 F. Supp. 35, 38 (E.D. Tenn. 1980); see also Cray, supra
note 1, at 217-18.
4. For a general discussion of the procedural due process remedies of a physician de-
nied staff privileges by a hospital, see Cray, supra note 1, at 217-18.
5. See, e.g., Atlantic Cleaners & Dryers, Inc. v. United States, 286 U.S. 427, 436 (1932)
(quoting The Nymph, 18 F. Cas. 506, 507 (C.C.D. Me. 1834) (No. 10,388)). For a general
discussion of the learned profession exemption, see Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 497 F.2d
1, 13 (4th Cir. 1974), rev'd, 421 U.S. 773 (1975).
6. Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (Supp. IV 1980).
7. National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 696 (1978)
(canon of ethics prohibiting members from submitting competitive bids for engineering ser-
vices suppresses competition and violates Sherman Act); Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421
U.S. 773, 786-88 (1975) (minimum-fee schedule enforced by a state bar association violated
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elimination of this barrier to suits within the medical profession
has fostered the increased reliance on the antitrust laws by physi-
cians denied staff privileges.
At the same time that the professional exemption was crum-
bling, Supreme Court decisions markedly circumscribed procedural
due process.8 Recent decisions have narrowed the scope of proce-
dural due process protection by limiting the activities that may be
classified as state action.9 The interests protected by procedural
due process-liberty and property-have also been limited.10 Fi-
nally, the Court has narrowed the procedural protections afforded
when there is state action and a protected property or liberty in-
terest."1 These developments have left physicians without much
procedural due process protection in most staff privilege
situations.19
This article will discuss the extent to which the antitrust laws
provide a remedy for the denial or revocation of staff privileges. 8
The jurisdictional requirements for the Sherman Act will be dis-
cussed first. Since the denial of staff privileges may constitute a
concerted refusal to deal,1' the development of this area of anti-
trust law must also be examined. This examination is critical be-
cause there has been much dispute over Supreme Court statements
that concerted refusals to deal are per se illegal.18 But even assum-
Sherman Act). There is some uncertainty, however, as to whether professionals are subject
to the same standards of liability as nonprofessionals, particularly with regard to trade prac-
tices that traditionally have been deemed to be per se illegal. See Arizona v. Maricopa
County Medical Soc'y, 102 S. Ct. 2466, 2475-76 (1982) (plurality opinion).
8. Cray, supra note 1, at 217-18.
9. See, e.g., Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345 (1974); Moose Lodge v.
Irvis, 407 U.S. 163 (1972).
10. See, e.g., Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341 (1976); Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693 (1976).
11. See, e.g., Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
12. Cray, supra note 1, at 219.
13. This article will deal solely with the denial of staff privileges to individual physi-
cians. These denials may be classified as concerted refusals to deal. See Robinson v.
Magovern, 456 F. Supp. 1000, 1005 (W.D. Pa. 1978). In contrast, hospitals might enter into
exclusive dealing arrangements with particular physicians, thereby foreclosing entry by any
other physicians. Such arrangements are subject to different considerations than concerted
refusals to deal and are not discussed here. For a discussion of the validity of exclusionary
contracts between hospitals and physicians, see Kessenick & Peer, Physicians' Access to the
Hospital: An Overview, 14 U.S.F. L. REv. 43 (1979).
14. See Robinson v. Magovern, 456 F. Supp. 1000, 1005 (W.D. Pa. 1978).
15. See Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5-6 (1958).
Some lower courts have held that concerted refusals to deal are per se illegal if they
involve a conspiracy among competitors to exclude others. See, e.g., Smith v. Pro Football,
Inc., 593 F.2d 1173, 1178-79 (D.C. Cir. 1978); Oreck Corp. v. Whirlpool Corp., 579 F.2d 126,
131 (2d Cir. 1978); North Am. Soccer League v. National Football League, 465 F. Supp. 665,
672-73 (S.D.N.Y. 1979). Other lower courts have held that concerted refusals are per se
1982]
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ing that all concerted refusals to deal are per se illegal, and that
per se rules apply to professions, denials of staff privileges may
nevertheless fall within a well-recognized exception to the per se
rule. After explaining why a per se rule may not be appropriate for
denials of staff privileges, the article will conclude with an exami-
nation of the considerations involved in applying a rule of reason
to concerted refusals to deal.
II. THE JURISDICTIONAL PREREQUISITES OF THE SHERMAN ACT
Restraints of trade are proscribed by the Sherman Act only if
they restrain "trade or commerce among the several States."1 Ju-
risdiction exists only if the restraint involves transactions in the
flow of interstate commerce or transactions affecting interstate
commerce. 17 This jurisdictional limitation poses special problems
for suits based on the denial or revocation of staff privileges be-
cause such action is usually local and apparently does not immedi-
ately affect interstate commerce. The jurisdictional barrier, how-
ever, is not insurmountable.
The Supreme Court has construed the jurisdiction of the
Sherman Act to reach the full extent of congressional power under
the commerce clause of the United States Constitution."8 The
scope of the Sherman Act has thus expanded with the expansion of
the commerce power. Some of the significant commerce power
cases illustrate the potential reach of the Sherman Act.
In Wickard v. Filburn,19 for example, the Supreme Court held
that the federal government has the power, under the commerce
clause, to regulate the amount of wheat grown by a farmer for per-
sonal consumption. Although the impact upon interstate commerce
resulting from one farmer's consumption of wheat might be consid-
illegal only if there is an initial showing of an anticompetitive effect. See, e.g., Neeld v.
National Hockey League, 594 F.2d 1297, 1298-99 nn.3-4 (9th Cir. 1979). Although evidence
of anticompetitive purpose or effect is necessary to establish a violation under the per se
rule, United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 224 n.59 (1940), Neeld requires
evidence of anticompetitive.effect as a prerequisite to invoking the per se rule. Neeld, 594
F.2d at 1300.
16. Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-2 (Supp. IV 1980). Section 1 provides: "Every con-
tract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or
commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal . . .
Id. § 1 (emphasis added).
17. See 1 P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST PRINCI-
PLES AND THEIR APPLICATION 232 (1978).
18. United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Ass'n, 322 U.S. 533, 553 (1944); see
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
19. 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
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ered trivial, the Court justified the regulation because the aggre-
gate effect of all farmers' personal consumption was not trivial. e A
broad construction of the commerce power was also rendered in
Katzenbach v. McClung. 1 In McClung federal regulations prohib-
iting discrimination were held applicable to a restaurant merely
because the restaurant received a substantial portion of its food
through interstate commerce.2 The Court also justified this regu-
lation under the commerce power on the ground that the aggregate
effect of all such discrimination would substantially affect inter-
state commerce.'
Wickard and McClung indicate that the broad grant of con-
gressional power under the commerce clause can be utilized to reg-
ulate individual activity which by itself hardly seems to have a
substantial effect on interstate commerce. If the jurisdiction of the
Sherman Act does in fact reach to the full extent of congressional
power, almost all economic activity would be subject to the Sher-
man Act.'4 Congressional commerce power can thus be construed
to extend to a hospital's denial of staff privileges.
The Supreme Court had occasion to adjudicate Sherman Act
jurisdictional issues in the health care field in Hospital Building
Co. v. Trustees of Rex Hospital Co.25 Hospital Building involved a
suit by a small hospital against another, larger hospital under sec-
tions 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act. The plaintiff, Rex Hospital, al-
leged that the defendant hospital, its administrator, its trustee,
and a local health planning agency conspired to restrain trade and
monopolize the market for hospital services by preventing the ex-
pansion of Rex Hospital. The Court cited the following interstate
contacts in upholding Sherman Act jurisdiction: the plaintiff pur-
chased medical supplies from out-of-state; the plaintiff received
payments for services from out-of-state insurers; the plaintiff paid
management fees to its out-of-state parent corporation; and the
plaintiff was to receive some of the financing for the expanded fa-
cilities from out-of-state lenders." These allegations alone were
deemed sufficient to establish jurisdiction; the plaintiff was not
forced to prove that the adverse consequences of the restraint
20. Id. at 124-29. The Court concluded that such a local activity could "be reached by
Congress if it exerts a substantial economic effect on interstate commerce ..... Id. at 125.
21. 379 U.S. 294 (1964).
22. Id. at 298-99.
23. Id. at 301.
24. 1 P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, supra note 17, 232.
25. 425 U.S. 738 (1976).
26. Id. at 739.
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would substantially affect commerce. 7 The court was satisfied that
the plaintiff had substantial interstate contacts that might be un-
reasonably burdened by the restraint."
Physicians whose staff privileges have been denied or revoked
often have had a more difficult time proving the requisite inter-
state contacts.2 For example, in Wolf v. Jane Phillips Episcopal-
Memorial Medical Center,80 the United States Court of Appeals
for the Tenth Circuit denied jurisdiction under the Sherman Act
to an osteopath who had been refused staff privileges at two hospi-
tals. Although the court found an illegal restraint of trade, it dis-
missed the case because the plaintiff's "business of practicing
medicine and furnishing medical services was wholly intrastate in
character."" The defendant's purchases of medical supplies and
other interstate actions were declared irrelevant; only the plain-
tiff's interstate contacts were relevant for the purpose of obtaining
jurisdiction under the Sherman Act.2
In contrast to Wolf, the district court in Zamiri v. William
Beaumont Hospital" refused to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction an
antitrust suit brought by a doctor who had been denied staff privi-
leges. The physician's allegation that a significant portion of his
potential plaintiffs received medicare or medicaid benefits was suf-
27. Id. at 744.
28. See id. at 745-46. Courts focus on the potential for a substantial effect on commerce
resulting from the restraint. In determining such a potential effect, courts must examine the
plaintiff's interstate contacts that might be affected by the restraint. If those contacts are
substantial, there is jurisdiction under the Act. See, e.g., St. Bernard Gen. Hosp. v. Hospital
Serv. Ass'n, 510 F.2d 1121, 1124 (5th Cir. 1975); Doctors, Inc. v. Blue Cross, 490 F.2d 48, 51-
53 (3d Cir. 1973).
29. See Crane v. Intermountain Health Care, Inc., 637 F.2d 715 (10th Cir. 1980); Wolf
v. Jane Phillips Episcopal-Memorial Medical Center, 513 F.2d 684, 687 (10th Cir. 1975);
Riggall v. Washington County Medical Soc'y, 249 F.2d 266, 268 (8th Cir. 1957), cert. denied,
355 U.S. 954 (1958) (no allegations suggesting burden upon interstate commerce); Daley v.
St. Agnes Hosp., 490 F. Supp. 1309, 1317 (E.D. Pa. 1980). But see Mishler v. St. Anthony's
Hosp. Syss., 1981-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 1 64,342, at 74,586 (10th Cir. 1981) (concurring opin-
ion); Everhart v. Jane C. Stormont Hosp., 1982-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 64,703 (D. Kan. 1982);
Malini v. Singleton & Assocs., 516 F. Supp. 440, 442-43 (S.D. Tex. 1981); Zamiri v. William
Beaumont Hosp., 430 F. Supp. 875, 876-77 (E.D. Mich. 1977).
30. 513 F.2d 684 (10th Cir. 1975).
31. Id. at 688.
32. Id. at 687-88. The court noted that the restraint alleged by the plaintiff did not
have a substantial effect upon interstate commerce. Id; see Borsody, The Antitrust Laws
and the Health Industry, 12 AKRON L. Rzv. 417, 427 (1979); see also United States v. Ore-
gon State Medical Soc'y, 343 U.S. 326 (1952); Spears Free Clinic & Hosp. v. Cleere, 197 F.2d
125 (10th Cir. 1952). Both cases hold that the business of practicing medicine is wholly
intrastate in character.
33. 430 F. Supp. 875 (E.D. Mich. 1977).
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ficient to avoid summary dismissal for lack of jurisdiction." The
court held that the eventual proof of those interstate contacts
would satisfy the jurisdictional requirement of the Sherman Act.
Zamiri demonstrates the potential ease of satisfying the "af-
fecting commerce" aspect of the Sherman Act's jurisdictional re-
quirement.38 In analyzing whether there are sufficient interstate
contacts that might be affected by a denial of staff privileges, the
following contacts may be relevant: the potential number of out-of-
state patients;86 the amount of reimbursements from out-of-state
insurance companies;37 the plaintiff's purchases of medical supplies
through interstate commerce; 8 and the receipt of medicare and
medicaid reimbursement from the plaintiff's potential patients.8'
Most physicians who have been denied staff privileges probably
will have a sufficient number of these interstate contacts that the
aggregate long-term impact of the denial will substantially affect
interstate commerce and thus satisfy the jurisdictional require-
ment of the Sherman Act.40
III. BACKGROUND: THE ANTITRUST LAWS
A. General Considerations
Section 1 of the Sherman Act proscribes "[e]very contract,
combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in
34. Id. at 877; see also Feminist Women's Health Center, Inc. v. Mohammad, 415 F.
Supp. 1258, 1264 (N.D. Fla. 1976), aff'd in part, 586 F.2d 530 (5th Cir. 1978).
35. See also, e.g., Lehrman v. Gulf Oil Corp., 464 F.2d 26, 35 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
409 U.S. 1077 (1972) (Sherman Act jurisdiction established by proof that service station
operator would purchase a significant amount of tires, batteries, and accessories through
interstate commerce over the entire period of his operation).
36. See Feminist Women's Health Center v. Mohammad, 586 F.2d 530, 540 (5th Cir.
1978); McLain v. Real Estate Bd., 583 F.2d 1315, 1320 (5th Cir. 1978) (customers moving
across state lines); St. Bernard Gen. Hosp. v. Hospital Serv. Ass'n, 510 F.2d 1121, 1124 (5th
Cir. 1975).
37. See Hospital Bldg. Co. v. Trustees of Rex Hosp., 425 U.S. 738, 744 (1976).
38. See Lehrman v. Gulf Oil Corp., 464 F.2d 26, 35 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S.
1077 (1972).
39. Zamiri v. William Beaumont Hosp., 430 F. Supp. 875, 877 (E.D. Mich. 1977). As one
commentator suggests, "[I]n an era of rapid communication, mobile population, and perva-
sive governmental regulation and financing of the health care industry," the defense of an
insubstantial effect on interstate commerce is becoming much less certain. Borsody, supra
note 32, at 428.
40. Mishler v. St. Anthony's Hosp. Syss., 1981-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 64,342, at 74,586
(10th Cir. 1981) (concurring opinion); Crane v. Intermountain Health Care, Inc., 637 F.2d
715 (10th Cir. 1980); Everhart v. Jane C. Stormont Hosp., 1982-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 1 64,703
(D. Kan. 1982); Malini v. Singleton & Assocs., 516 F. Supp. 440, 442-43 (S.D. TeL 1981);
Zamiri v. William Beaumont Hop., 430 F. Supp. 875, 877 (E.D. Mich. 1977).
19821
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
restraint of trade or commerce among the several states."4 1 Not all
restraints of trade have been declared illegal. Section 1 prohibits
only restraints that unreasonably suppress competition; it does not
ban restraints adopted for valid commercial purposes even though
their ancillary effect may be to restrain competition.42
Courts have applied two different analyses in determining the
validity of restraints. Courts most often determine the validity of a
restraint by applying the first analysis: the rule of reason. Under
this analysis, courts examine the reasonableness of the restraint in
light of the nature and effect of the restraint, the history of the
restraint and its purpose, the facts peculiar to the business or in-
dustry, and the condition of the business or industry before and
after the restraint."8 In contrast to the rule of reason analysis,
courts have sometimes applied a summary, per se rule to invalidate
a restraint of trade, irrespective of any professed legitimate pur-
pose. The per se rule is typically applied in cases in which there
has been "price fixing" or the restraint is "'plainly anticompeti-
tive' and very likely without 'redeeming virtue.'""
B. The Rule of Reason, the Per Se Rule, and Concerted
Refusals to Deal
The application of the rule of reason and the per se rule to
concerted refusals to deal has had a turbulent history. Although
Supreme Court decisions have often been viewed as mandating the
application of a per se rule to concerted refusals to deal,46 this ap-
plication has been severely criticized.47 Moreover, lower courts
have not consistently applied the per se rule.4' And the scope of
the activities that constitute concerted refusals, which thus fall
41. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (Supp. IV 1980); see supra note 16.
42. See Cement Mfrs. Protective Ass'n v. United States, 268 U.S. 588, 603-04 (1925).
43. See Chicago Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918); Standard Oil
Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 65-67 (1911).
44. See, e.g., United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940).
45. Broadcast Music, Inc. v. CBS, 441 U.S. 1, 9 (1979).
46. See, e.g., Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958); see also Bauer,
Per Se Illegality of Concerted Refusals to Deal: A Rule Ripe for Reexamination, 79 COLUM.
L. Rzv. 685, 687-92 (1979); Handler, Recent Developments in Antitrust Law: 1948-1959, 59
COLUM. L. REV. 843, 863-64 (1959); Comment, Political Blacklisting by the Motion Picture
Industry: A Sherman Act Violation, 74 YALE L.J. 567, 569-77 (1965).
47. See L. SULLIVAN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF AwrrrrusT 240-41 (1977) (per se rule
should be applied only to explicit boycotts and boycotts lacking any alternative purpose or
effect benefiting competition); Bauer, supra note 46, at 686.
48. See Note, Trade Association Exclusionary Practices: An Affirmative Role for the
Rule of Reason, 66 COLUM. L. Rav. 1486, 1487 (1966).
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within the per se rule, has been subject to considerable confusion."'
This confusion is compounded by the absence of A uniform defini-
tion of what constitutes a concerted refusal to deal. 0 Two types of
cases, however, often have been distinguished. Some concerted re-
fusals to deal involve parties conspiring to make it difficult or im-
possible for others to compete in the same market at the same
level; other concerted refusals are attempts by conspirators to
achieve goals other than the exclusion of competitors."' Because
the first type of concerted refusal is more likely to possess an-
ticompetitive effects, this distinction is important in analyzing the
validity of the restraint. 2
One of the earliest Supreme Court adjudications of concerted
refusals to deal was Eastern States Retail Lumber Dealers' Ass'n
v. United States." In Eastern States, the retail lumber dealers
were found to be guilty of implicitly agreeing not to deal with
wholesalers who sold directly to the public. Although an individual
dealer could unilaterally refuse to deal with a wholesaler for any
reason, the dealers could not legally conspire to cease trade with a
wholesaler.54 In summarily invalidating the retail dealers' scheme,
the Court emphasized the anticompetitive purpose and effect of
this coercive conduct."
In Paramount Famous Lasky Corp. v. United States," the
Supreme Court applied the rule of reason to a concerted refusal to
deal in spite of the fact that only three years earlier it had applied
the per se rule to price fixing5 7 The Paramount Court invalidated
an agreement among film producers and distributors to refuse to
deal with any exhibitor who failed to contractually assent to arbi-
49. See St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Barry, 438 U.S. 531, 543 (1978).
50. Id. The Supreme Court noted that "the decisions reflect a marked lack of uniform-
ity in defining the term." Id.
51. Id.; L. SULLIVAN, supra note 47, at 232.
52. See Broadcast Music, Inc. v. CBS, 441 U.S. 1, 9 (1979); cf. Bauer, supra note 46, at
700 n.73 (all concerted refusals to deal are per se illegal under Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale
Stores, 359 U.S. 207 (1959)).
53. 234 U.S. 600 (1914). The Supreme Court decided Eastern States, like the first con-
certed refusal case, Montague & Co. v. Lowry, 193 U.S. 38 (1903), before the rule of reason/
per se rule distinction had been developed.
54. 234 U.S. at 614.
55. Id.
56. 282 U.S. 30 (1930).
57. The per se test first appeared in United States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S.
392 (1927). The Court noted that "[t]he power to fix prices ...involves power to control
the market and to fix arbitrary and unreasonable prices .... Agreements which create such
potential power may well be held to be in themselves immeasurable or unlawful restraints..
." Id. at 397.
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tration.' The Supreme Court affirmed the lower court's holding
that the agreement requiring arbitration was unreasonable.'9
In contrast to the rule of reason analysis applied in Para-
mount, the Supreme Court appeared to apply a per se rule in
Fashion Originators' Guild of America v. FTC. 0 The Fashion
Originators' Guild of America ("FOGA") was an association of gar-
ment manufacturers formed as an instrument to stop "style pi-
rates"-manufacturers who copied guild members' originals.
FOGA established an elaborate system for the detection of copied
garments. When such a garment was found in a retail store, the
members of FOGA, who comprised sixty percent of the manufac-
turers of high priced women's clothes, would refuse to deal with
the retailer. 1 In holding that this agreement violated section 1 of
the Sherman Act, the Court refused to hear evidence relating to
the reasonableness of FOGA's efforts to protect members from
style pirates.e Although Fashion Originators' thus appears to
mandate the application of the per se rule to concerted refusals to
deal implemented by competitors possessing market power,63 there
are reasons to remain skeptical of this conclusion. The case also
involved agreements among guild members prohibiting retail ad-
vertising and regulating discounts.' These agreements would
clearly have been characterized as price fixing and subject to per se
invalidation irrespective of the concerted refusal to deal."
Although Fashion Originators' may have left some doubt
about whether concerted refusals to deal are per se illegal, the is-
sue was largely resolved in Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores,
Inc. 6 Klor's involved a suit by a retail store against one of its com-
petitors and a group of appliance manufacturers and their distrib-
utors. The retail store alleged that the competitor had induced the
manufacturers either to refuse to deal with the retail store or to
sell appliances to the retail store at higher prices. 7 In declaring
this restraint illegal, the Supreme Court noted that "[g]roup boy-
58. 282 U.S. at 41-42.
59. Id.
60. 312 U.S. 457 (1941).
61. Id. at 461-63.
62. Id. at 468.
63. See L. SULLIVAN, supra note 47, at 235; Bauer, supra note 46, at 688.
64. 312 U.S. at 463.
65. See United States v. Gasoline Retailers Ass'n, 285 F.2d 688, 691 (7th Cir. 1961);
United States v. United Liquors Corp., 149 F. Supp. 609 (W.D. Tenn. 1956), aff'd per
curiam, 352 U.S. 991 (1957); see also supra note 44 and accompanying text.
66. 359 U.S. 207 (1959).
67. Id. at 209.
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cotts, or concerted refusals by traders to deal with other traders,
have long been held to be in the forbidden category. They have not
been saved by allegations that they were reasonable in the specific
circumstances. ... "68 Although Klor's suggests the application of
a per se rule to all concerted refusals, some commentators have
cautioned against that conclusion.6
The need for caution in applying a per se rule is nowhere more
evident than in cases in which concerted refusals to deal are
adopted as means of industry self-regulation. In Radiant Burners,
Inc. v. Peoples Light & Coke Co.,70 a group of public utilities, nat-
ural gas suppliers, and manufacturers of gas burners formed an as-
sociation that operated testing laboratories to determine the
safety, utility, and durability of gas burners. It gave its seal of ap-
proval to burners that passed its tests. If a burner failed to pass
the tests, the utilities participating in the association would refuse
to provide gas for use in those burners.7 1 Notwithstanding the ap-
parent consumer protection benefits of the self-regulation, the Su-
preme Court held that the district court erred in dismissing the
plaintiff's action for failure to state a claim."
The Radiant Burners Court cited Kor's to support its conclu-
sion that the refusal to deal fell within the class of restraints pro-
scribed by the Sherman Act.73 In arriving at that conclusion, the
Court emphasized the fact that the association was applying non-
objective standards for the seal of approval. 4 The tests were "not
based on 'objective standards,' but are influenced by respondents,
some of whom are in competition with petitioner, and thus its de-
terminations can be made 'arbitrarily and capriciously.' ,,75 The
68. Id. at 212 (footnote omitted).
69. See L. SULLIVAN, supra note 47, at 236; Bird, Sherman Act Limitations on Non-
commercial Concerted Refusals to Deal, 1970 DuKz L.J. 247, 276. Bird argues that since the
Klor's defendants offered no justification for their conduct, see Brief for Respondents at 3,
Klor's, 359 U.S. at 207, one should not automatically conclude that the Court applied a per
se rule. Bird contends that it is possible that the Court applied a rule of reason, but since
there was no justification given for the activity in question, the Court concluded that the
activity was a violation of the Sherman Act. In contrast, Sullivan argues that the per se rule
of Klor's applies only to concerted refusals to deal that exclude competitors. L. SULLIVAN,
supra note 47, at 235-41.
70. 364 U.S. 656 (1961).
71. Id. at 657-58.
72. Id. at 659-60.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 658.
75. Id; cf. American Soc'y of Mechanical Eng'rs v. Hydrolevel Corp., 102 S. Ct. 1935
(1982) (use of standards to deprive competitor of market for its device), aff'g 635 F.2d 118
(2d Cir. 1980).
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Court thus reasoned that anticompetitive purposes rather than le-
gitimate self-regulatory purposes, such as safety, may have been
the motive for the denial of the seal of approval. The association
ostensibly could have alleviated these concerns in either of two
ways. First, it could have adopted objective standards that would
have limited its discretion. Implementing objective standards
would obviate the possibility that any denial was based on an-
ticompetitive reasons by eliminating the subjectivity through
which such motives operate. Second, even if the association could
not have devised objective standards, it could have implemented
procedural safeguards to ensure that the denial of the seal, and
hence the refusal to deal, was based on legitimate self-regulatory
reasons. Had the association taken these steps to assure the ab-
sence of anticompetitive motives, the Court may not have summa-
rily invalidated the self-regulatory refusal to deal.
Only two years later, in Silver v. New York Stock Exchange '7
the Supreme Court gave some indication of the importance of lim-
iting the ability of self-regulators to pursue anticompetitive prac-
tices. In Silver the stock exchange requested that all broker-deal-
ers stop providing private wire connections to another broker-
dealer. Those connections were necessary for the broker-dealer to
compete in the securities market.7" The Court stated that con-
certed refusals to deal are per se illegal "absent any justification
derived from the policy of another statute or otherwise. 17 Exam-
ining the policies of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, the Court
found a justification for general self-regulation in this area. e The
Court held, however, that the self-regulation in this specific con-
text could not withstand antitrust scrutiny because the boycotted
broker-dealer was not afforded notice and an opportunity for a
hearing.80 The Court cited two reasons for this procedural require-
ment: (1) the need to impede anticompetitive motives from con-
trolling self-regulatory decisions, and (2) the desirability of provid-
ing a reviewing court with evidence of the purposes for the self-
regulatory decisions.81
76. 373 U.S. 341 (1963).
77. Id. at 348.
78. Id. at 348-49 (emphasis added).
79. Id. at 361.
80. Id. at 361-63.
81. The first reason for the procedural requirements in Silver is to lessen the impact of
anticompetitive motives. Id. at 361. By forcing a self-regulating body to declare the legiti-
mate reasons for its actions and to listen to opposing viewpoints from the affected individu-
als, the procedural requirements of notice and a hearing inhibit the adoption of anticom-
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Silver is significant for explicitly recognizing the importance of
procedural safeguards as a prerequisite to the validity of self-regu-
latory refusals to deal. Although the Silver Court derived the pro-
cedural requirement from the Securities Exchange Act, the reasons
the Court cited to support the procedural requirement apply to all
self-regulatory concerted refusals to deal. Lower courts have thus
construed Silver as mandating the adoption of procedural safe-
guards for any valid self-regulatory concerted refusal to deal.6 '
Silver is also important because it expands the application of
the rule of reason to any concerted refusal to deal adopted pursu-
ant to a regulatory scheme that is based on a "justification derived
from the policy of another statute [other than the Sherman Act] or
otherwise."8 The phrase "or otherwise" has been construed to per-
mit the application of the rule of reason to any self-regulatory re-
fusal to deal justified by the peculiar circumstances of the indus-
try." Accordingly, Silver has been read as creating an exception to
the per se rule-an exception which extends beyond the mere con-
text of securities regulation. 5
Most courts thus apply a per se rule to concerted refusals to
deal, although some limit the scope of the per se rule to those con-
certed refusals that have the effect of preventing excluded parties
from competing in the same market as the conspirators.86 The
courts apply a rule of reason, however, to all self-regulatory con-
petitive refusals to deal in all regulatory contexts. The second justification for the
procedural requirement, like the first, extends beyond the Silver context of securities regu-
lation. Providing a reviewing court with evidence of the factors considered in adopting the
concerted refusal is valuable because the reviewing court is better able to assess the extent
to which the regulatory body is motivated by legitimate, rather than anticompetitive, justifi-
cations. Id. at 363.
82. See, e.g., United States Trotting Ass'n v. Chicago Downs Ass'n, 487 F. Supp. 1008,
1015-16 (N.D. Ill. 1980); McCreery Angus Farms v. American Angus Ass'n, 379 F. Supp.
1008, 1018 (S.D. Ill. 1974).
83. 373 U.S. at 348-49 (emphasis added).
84. See Hatley v. American Quarter Horse Ass'n, 552 F.2d 646, 651-53 (5th Cir. 1977);
United States Trotting Ass'n v. Chicago Downs Ass'n, 487 F. Supp. 1008, 1015-16 (N.D. I11.
1980); Linseman v. World Hockey Ass'n, 439 F. Supp. 1315, 1321 (D. Conn. 1977); McCreery
Angus Farms v. American Angus Ass'n, 379 F. Supp. 1008, 1018 (S.D. Ill. 1974); Denver
Rockets v. All-Pro Management, 325 F. Supp. 1049, 1064-65 (C.D. Cal. 1971).
85. See, e.g., Hatley v. American Quarter Horse Ass'n, 552 F.2d 646, 652-53 (5th Cir.
1977); United States Trotting Aas'n v. Chicago Downs Ass'n, 487 F. Supp. 1008, 1015-16
(N.D. Ill. 1980); McCreery Angus Farms v. American Angus Ass'n, 379 F. Supp. 1008, 1015-
16 (S.D. Ill. 1974); Amway Corp., 93 F.T.C. 618, 684-85 (1978).
86. See, e.g., Smith v. Pro Football, Inc., 593 F.2d 1173, 1178-79 (D.C. Cir. 1978); Oreck
Corp. v. Whirlpool Corp., 579 F.2d 126, 131 (2d Cir. 1978) (distinction between "horizontal"
and "vertical" restraints); North Am. Soccer League v. National Football League, 465 F.
Supp. 665, 672-74 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
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certed refusals to deal that have satisfied the requirements of Sil-
ver and its progeny-"
Notwithstanding the above limits to the per se rule, the
United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit has gone fur-
ther, requiring a plaintiff to make an initial showing that the con-
certed refusal has an "arguable demonstrative" anticompetitive
purpose or effect before applying a per se rule.ee Although this may
reflect underlying discontent with applying a per se rule to con-
certed refusals to deal,"9 the Supreme Court has not challenged the
per se rule. Thus, the ensuing discussion of the denial of staff priv-
ileges will be based on the analytic framework outlined in Klor's,
Radiant Burners, and Silver and developed in the majority of
lower court opinions.' 0
IV. THE LEGALITY OF DENIALS OF STAFF PRIVILEGES
A. Hospital Administration and Staff Privileges
An analysis of the antitrust implications of denials of medical
staff privileges requires some knowledge of hospital administration.
The antitrust analysis first requires an understanding of the organ-
ization of the hospital medical staff and the procedures for selec-
87. One court formulated the criteria in this manner:
(1) There is a legislative mandate for self-regulation "or otherwise". In dis-
cussing the history of the New York Stock Exchange in Silver, the Court sug-
gests that self-regulation is inherently required by the market's structure. From
this basis, it has been argued that where collective action is required by the
industry structure, it falls within the "or otherwise" provision of Silver. Note,
Trade Association Exclusionary Practices: An Affirmative Role for the Rule of
Reason, 66 Colum. L.Rev. 1486 (1966).
(2) The collective action is intended to (a) accomplish an end consistent
with the policy justifying self-regulation, (b) is reasonably related to that goal,
and (c) is no more extensive than necessary.
(3) The association provides procedural safeguards which assure that the
restraint is not arbitrary and which furnishes a basis for judicial review.
Denver Rockets v. All-Pro Management, 325 F. Supp. 1049, 1064-65 (C.D. Cal. 1971); see
cases cited supra note 82.
88. See, e.g., Neeld v. National Hockey League, 594 F.2d 1297, 1298-99 nn.3-4 (9th Cir.
1979).
89. For a critique of the per se rule as applied to concerted refusals to deal, see Bauer,
supra note 46.
90. Although the Court might possibly directly overrule the per se approach espoused
in Klor's, cf. Continental TV, Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977) (invalidating
the per se rule as applied to vertical territorial restrictions imposed by nondominant firm),
it seems more likely that the Court will limit the per se rule to those concerted refusals to
deal directed at precluding competitors from entering the market and will also adopt the




tion of staff members. One must also understand the reasons why
hospital administrators are compelled to exercise some discretion
over who is allowed on the medical staff.
The governing board of a hospital is ultimately responsible for
ensuring that the hospital provides high quality patient care.91 But
the board alone is incapable of fully carrying out those responsibil-
ities; hospital boards must by necessity rely heavily on the advice
of medical staff members who possess the technical expertise re-
quired to evaluate the competency of new applicants and the ade-
quacy of health care provided by current staff members."
Hospital medical staffs are organized in committees to facili-
tate the exchange of information with governing boards. The medi-
cal staff meets periodically and selects an executive committee,
composed of active staff members, to represent the staff." In addi-
tion to serving as a liaison between the medical staff and the gov-
erning board, the executive committee advises the board on the
qualifications of new applicants and current staff members."
Although the governing board possesses ultimate responsibil-
ity for staff selection, it usually delegates to the medical staff the
authority to assess the qualifications of staff members." The medi-
cal staff, through the executive committee, can thus exercise con-
siderable influence over the extension of staff privileges. In fact, if
the governing board disagrees with the recommendation of the
medical staff, a joint committee composed of members of the medi-
cal staff and the governing board generally convenes to resolve the
disagreement." This exercise of influence by the medical staff may
constitute a concerted refusal to deal and thus violate the antitrust
laws.9
7
The need for hospitals to monitor the competence of the medi-
91. JOINT COMMISSION ON ACCREDITATION OF HOSPITALS, ACCREDITATION MANUAL FOR
HOSPITALS 51-52 (1980) [hereinafter cited as JOINT COMMISSION]; Southwick, The Legal As-
pects of Medical Staff Function, 46 Hose. PROGRESS 84, 85 (1965), reprinted in AMERICAN
MEDICAL ASS'N, READINGS IN HOSPITAL LAW 154 (1965) [hereinafter cited as Southwick, Le-
gal Aspects].
92. Southwick, Legal Aspects, supra note 91, at 85.
93. JOINT COMMISSION, supra note 91, at 73-89.
94. Staff appointment is generally granted for a two-year interval after which the staff
member's qualifications are reassessed. Id. at 78-79.
95. Id. at 73-79.
96. Id.
97. See Robinson v. Magovern, 456 F. Supp. 1000, 1005 (W.D. Pa. 1978) (question of
fact whether denial of staff privileges violated antitrust law); cf. United States v. General
Motors Corp., 384 U.S. 127 (1966) (automobile dealers joined to induce automobile manu-
facturer to stop selling to dealers who sold to discounters).
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cal staffs has evolved from the changing conception of hospitals.
Although hospitals were once viewed as institutions that merely
provided the facilities for medical care, they increasingly have be-
come viewed as actual providers of health care.98 This attitude is
reflected in the judicial willingness to impose liability upon hospi-
tals for negligently monitoring the competence of hospital person-
nel.99 As a result, hospital boards have an affirmative obligation to
ensure that current staff members, as well as applicants for staff
membership, possess the requisite qualifications and sufficient
competence to discharge their duties as staff physicians. Governing
boards cannot relieve themselves of this obligation by delegating
the task to the medical staff.100 Nevertheless the boards need the
expert advice of physicians and may be negligent for not soliciting
the recommendations of the medical staff.'0 ' Paradoxically, in
soliciting the recommendations of the medical staff and thereby
fulfilling its duty to monitor the quality of health care, a hospital
board may be participating in a concerted refusal to deal and as a
result violating the antitrust laws.
B. Denials of Staff Privileges as Industry Self-Regulation
Although the denial of staff privileges is a somewhat novel
concerted refusal to deal, it has many of the attributes of classic
concerted refusals.10' It is structurally very similar to the concerted
refusal to deal in United States v. General Motors Corp.08 In
General Motors an association of automobile dealers illegally con-
spired with the General Motors Corporation, which controlled a re-
source essential to automobile dealers-the automobile-to elimi-
nate automobile sales through "discount houses.' '""s The United
States Supreme Court held that the collaborative actions of Gen-
eral Motors and its dealer associations were a "classic conspiracy
98. Southwick, The Hospital as an Institution-Expanding Responsibilities Change
Its Relationship with the Staff Physician, 9 CAL. W.L. REV. 429, 429, 432 (1973) [hereinaf-
ter cited as Southwick, Hospital as an Institution]; see supra note 2 and accompanying
text.
99. See, e.g., Purcell & Tuscon Gen. Hosp. v. Zimbelman, 18 Ariz. App. 75, 500 P.2d
335 (1972); Mitchell County Hosp. Auth. v. Joiner, 229 Ga. 140, 189 S.E.2d 412 (1972); Dar-
ling v. Charleston Community Memorial Hosp., 33 Ill. 2d 326, 333, 211 N.E.2d 253, 258
(1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 946 (1966).
100. Southwick, Hospital as an Institution, supra note 98, at 462-63.
101. Southwick, Legal Aspects, supra note 91, at 84.
102. Cf. cases cited supra notes 53, 56, 60 & 66 (adjudications of concerted refusals to
deal).
103. 384 U.S. 127 (1966).
104. Id. at 130.
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in restraint of trade. ' 10 5 Similarly, members of the medical staff
can be viewed as conspiring to induce the hospital, which possesses
an essential resource-medical facilities-to refuse to deal with
other physicians who might compete with members of the medical
staff. To the extent that the concerted refusal of the medical staff
is aimed at excluding competitors, it can be viewed as more restric-
tive than the refusal in General Motors, which was devised merely
to stop the competitors from selling to discounters.
A similar analogy can be made to the concerted refusal to deal
in Radiant Burners v. Peoples Light & Coke Co.'06 The refusal of
the gas association in Radiant to give the seal of approval to the
plaintiff's gas burner was invalidated because the criteria for issu-
ing a seal were not based on objective considerations, but instead
were subject to the influence of the plaintiff's competitors.10 7 Simi-
larly, a hospital's refusal to extend staff privileges to a doctor may
not be predicated solely on objective criteria. Indeed, the appli-
cant's competitors-members of the medical staff-will be in a
strong position to influence the decision whether to grant staff
privileges. Thus, the decision to grant staff privileges is just as
likely to be based on anticompetitive reasons as the refusal to
grant the seal of approval in Radiant.
The denial of staff privileges thus closely resembles other re-
straints that have been classified as concerted refusals to deal. If
the requisite conspiracy or concerted action is established, the de-
nial of staff privileges would appear to be an illegal group boycott.
But proof of the requisite conspiracy among competitors, which in-
vokes per se analysis in boycott cases, may be difficult to establish
in all staff privilege cases. The advisory medical staff committees
may not contain specialists in all fields. Thus, the denial of staff
privileges to a specialist who has no competitors on the medical
staff committee advising the board may not be considered a viola-
tion. The denial may not be considered to encompass either a con-
spiracy among competitors or a conspiracy at all.108 Conversely, a
denial of staff privileges may be considered a concerted refusal to
deal if the applicaitt has competitors on the advisory staff commit-
tees.109 Because the concerted refusal to deal in this context would
105. Id. at 140.
106. 364 U.S. 656 (1961); see supra text accompanying notes 70-75.
107. 364 U.S. at 658.
108. See Robinson v. Magovern, 521 F. Supp. 842, 892-96, 908 (W.D. Pa. 1981).
109. Robinson v. Magovern, 456 F. Supp. 1000, 1005 (W.D. Pa. 1978). Even if a compet-
itor of the applicant is a member of the advisory medical staff committee, a conspiracy
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have the effect of precluding the conspirators' competitors from
obtaining access to a resource necessary for them to effectively
compete with the conspirators, this refusal would be within the
class of concerted refusals that has traditionally been subjected to
the per se rule under section 1 of the Sherman Act.110 Inasmuch as
hospitals have legitimate reasons for selectively granting staff priv-
ileges and for relying on the recommendations of their medical
staffs, the application of a per se rule, which would summarily in-
validate the denial, seems inappropriate.'
Some lower courts have applied a rule of reason to concerted
refusals to deal that have no apparent anticompetitive motive.112
The Supreme Court has not had occasion, however, to draw any
such distinction, particularly when, as here, the effect of the re-
fusal is to preclude entry by a competitor.113 But the Supreme
Court has intimated that a rule of reason analysis might apply to
some concerted refusals to deal adopted as objective methods of
industry self-regulation.
1 4
In Silver v. New York Stock Exchange,'" the Court laid the
might not be established. The competing doctor serves as an employee of the hospital in
advising the board and thus arguably cannot conspire with his employer because of the
intracorporate conspiracy doctrine. See Moles v. Morton F. Plant Hosp., 1980-1981 Trade
Cas. (CCH) 63,600, at 77,188 (M.D. Fla. 1978). The competing doctor, however, "has an
independent, personal stake in achieving the object of the conspiracy" because he carries on
his own medical business. Robinson v. Magovern, 521 F. Supp. 842, 907 (W.D. Pa. 1981).
The intracorporate conspiracy doctrine thus would not be available to defeat the inference
of a conspiracy. Id. See generally H & B Equip. Co. v. International Harvester Co., 577 F.2d
239, 244 (5th Cir. 1978); Morton Bldgs., Inc. v. Morton Bldgs., Inc., 531 F.2d 910, 917 (8th
Cir. 1976); Greenville Publishing Co. v. Daily Reflector, Inc., 496 F.2d 391, 399 (4th Cir.
1974); Marrese v. American Academy of Orthopedic Surgeons, 496 F. Supp. 236, 241 (N.D.
Ill. 1980).
110. See supra notes 1-2, 50-52 & 89 and accompanying text.
111. Application of a per se rule probably would force hospital boards to stop using the
recommendations of their staffs. It would be difficult, however, for the boards to procure
other competent advice.
112. See, e.g., Worthen Bank & Trust Co. v. National BankAmericard, Inc., 485 F.2d
119, 124-25 (8th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 918 (1974); G.A. McQuade Tours, Inc. v.
Consolidated Air Tour Manual Comm., 467 F.2d 178, 186-87 (5th Cir. 1972), cert. denied,
409 U.S. 1109 (1973); cf. Smith v. Pro Football, Inc., 593 F.2d 1173, 1177-78 (D.C. Cir. 1978)
(football player claimed that the NFL draft constituted a group boycott because profes-
sional football clubs refuse to deal with any player before he has been drafted).
113. Recently, however, a plurality of the Supreme Court intimated that the per se rule
may not apply to restraints adopted by professionals if the purpose of the restraints is to
enhance the quality of the service the profession provides to the public. Arizona v. Maricopa
County Medical Soc'y, 102 S. Ct. 2466, 2475 (1982) (plurality opinion). The scope of this
possible qualification to the per se rule remains to be explored. See infra text accompanying
notes 132-58.
114. See supra notes 70-85 and accompanying text.
115. 373 U.S. 341 (1963).
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foundation for the industry self-regulation exception to per se in-
validity for all concerted refusals to deal. Two lower courts have
interpreted Silver to permit the application of the rule of reason
analysis to concerted refusals to deal if:
(1) There is a legislative mandate for self-regulation "or
otherwise."
(2) The collective action is intended to (a) accomplish an end
consistent with the policy justifying self-regulation, (b) is rea-
sonably related to that goal, and (c) is no more exclusive than
necessary.
(3) The [defendant] provides procedural safeguards which as-
sure that the restraint is not arbitrary and which furnishes a
basis for judicial review."O
The first prerequisite to the Silver exception has been liberally
construed. 117 Rather than requiring that there be an actual legisla-
tive mandate approving collective action, concerted action may be
mandated by the industry structure. 118 When the industry struc-
ture is such that concerted action is necessary for the survival of
the industry, the first requirement is satisfied." 9 For example, the
Supreme Court applied a rule of reason to concerted activities
among members of the news media in Associated Press v. United
States.120 The Court assessed the validity of agreements among
members of the Associated Press information network not to pro-
vide wire services to its competitors."1 Although the Court held
that the restraint'was unreasonable, it noted that cooperation in
news gathering among members of the media is essential to the
116. Denver Rockets v. All-Pro Management, 325 F. Supp. 1049, 1064-65 (C.D. Cal.
1971); see also McCreery Angus Farms v. American Angus Ass'n, 379 F. Supp. 1008, 1018
(S.D. Ill. 1974).
117. See Denver Rockets v. All-Pro Management, 325 F. Supp. 1049 (C.D. Cal. 1971).
118. United States Trotting Ass'n v. Chicago Downs Ass'n, 487 F. Supp. 1008, 1015-16
(N.D. Ill. 1980); McCreery Angus Farms v. American Angus Ass'n, 379 F. Supp. 1008, 1018
(S.D. Ill. 1974); Note, supra note 48, at 1501; see also Comment, Antitrust Law: Procedural
Safeguard Requirements in Concerted Refusals to Deal: An Application to Professional
Sports-Denver Rockets v. All-Pro Management, Inc. (C.D. Cal. 1971), 10 SAN DIEGO L.
REV. 413 (1973). But see Blalock v. Ladies Professional Golf Ass'n, 359 F. Supp. 1260, 1266-
67 (N.D. Ga. 1973) (applying Silver exception only when mandated by federal statute).
Some policy justification must support the restraints that constitute the industry self-regu-
lation. See McDonnell v. Michigan Chapter No. 10, Am. Inst. of Real Estate Appraisers, 587
F.2d 7, 9 (6th Cir. 1978).
119. Hatley v. American Quarter Horse Ass'n, 552 F.2d 646, 652 (5th Cir. 1977). But see
Linseman v. World Hockey Ass'n, 439 F. Supp. 1315, 1321 (D. Conn. 1977).
120. 326 U.S. 1 (1945).
121. Id. at 13-15.
1982]
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
industry's operation.122
Grants of medical staff privileges present considerations simi-
lar to those in Associated Press. Because hospitals may be liable
for the acts of staff physicians, the governing board of a hospital
has an obligation to ensure that all staff physicians are compe-
tent. 12 The board is not, however, capable of evaluating the cre-
dentials and performance of physicians but instead must rely on
the recommendations of skilled practitioners.1 2 4 Without such ad-
vice, hospital boards would not be able to monitor effectively their
staffs, guard against legal liability, and maintain public confidence
in the hospital. Thus, the inherent nature of the hospital indus-
try-the potential liability of hospitals for staff physicians and the
degree of expertise required to evaluate physicians-appears to be
a sufficient mandate for self-regulation by hospitals.
The second prerequisite for the Silver exception is also satis-
fied in the staff privilege context. The concerted action in denials
of staff privileges consists of agreements among physicians and the
hospital to exclude other physicians. But that agreement, which is
inferred from the board's acceptance of the staff physicians' ad-
vice, flows directly from the hospital's need to monitor its staff.
The concerted action thus is intended to accomplish an objective
that underlies the policies justifying self-regulation. Moreover, the
concerted refusal appears reasonably related to the need to moni-
tor the staff because the staff physicians are in the best position to
evaluate the competence of other physicians. Finally, the concerted
action is no more extensive than necessary because the staff mem-
bers' advice must be based on the applicant's qualifications, which
"shall be specifically related to proper licensure, training, experi-
ence, and documented current competence." 2 s
The third prerequisite for the Silver exception requires the
adoption of procedural safeguards to ensure that the concerted ac-
tion is not predicated on anticompetitive motives. Silver has been
construed as requiring notice and an opportunity for a hearing. 
26
For example, in McCreery Angus Farms v. American Angus
Ass'n,1 2 7 cattle breeders were suspended from a breeding associa-
122. Id. at 13-14.
123. See supra notes 98-101 and accompanying text.
124. See supra text accompanying note 101.
125. JOINT COMMISSION, supra note 91, at 73-75.
126. See, e.g., Rearick v. Holstein-Friesian Ass'n, 472 F. Supp. 464, 466 (W.D. Pa.
1979).
127. 379 F. Supp. 1008 (S.D. I1. 1974).
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tion for failing to follow an association rule relating to blood typ-
ing. The district court, however, held that the boycott was per se
invalid 12  because the excluded breeders were not given advance
notice that the association was reviewing their actions, adequate
opportunity to respond to the charges against them, or an opportu-
nity to confront their accuser.1 '9
For a denial of staff privileges to avoid per se illegality, it thus
must be the outcome of fair procedures. The hospital must give the
physician notice of a hearing concerning his qualifications and an
opportunity to offer evidence of his competence and respond to
any alleged deficiencies in his qualifications.8 0
If proper procedural safeguards are provided, a hospital's de-
nial of staff privileges based on staff recommendations apparently
falls within the Silver exception to per se treatment of concerted
refusals to deal. The denial of staff privileges, however, still must
be subjected to a rule of reason analysis. The analysis in such cases
focuses on the power, purpose, and effects of the restraint. When a
court finds that anticompetitive concerns predominate, the refusal
to deal is held to be per se illegal.'3 '
C. The Emerging Professional Qualification to Antitrust
Liability
The application of the rule of reason to staff privilege cases,
instead of the more stringent per se rule, may be warranted be-
cause the restraints in staff privilege cases are imposed by mem-
bers of a profession. 3 2 Although the Supreme Court of the United
States has repeatedly disavowed any wholesale professional exemp-
tion from antitrust liability, "8 it has nonetheless consistently indi-
cated that the antitrust laws might be applied less rigorously to
professions than to trades or industries.
3 4
The Supreme Court explicitly rejected an expansive profes-
128. Id. at 1018-19.
129. Id. at 1018.
130. See generally JoINT COMMISSION, supra note 91, at 78.
131. Neeld v. National Hockey League, 594 F.2d 1297, 1299 (9th Cir. 1979).
132. Everhart v. Jane C. Stormont Hosp., 1981-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 64,703 (D. Kan.
1982). For a discussion of the application of the rule of reason to hospital staff privilege
cases, see infra notes 159-66.
133. See National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 686-87
(1978); Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 787 (1975).
134. See Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Soc'y, 102 S. Ct. 2466, 2475-76 (1982)
(plurality opinion); National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 696
(1978); Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 787 n.17 (1975).
1982]
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
sional exemption from antitrust liability in Goldfarb v. Virginia
State Bar.'" The Goldfarb Court invalidated a minimum fee
schedule adopted and enforced by a local bar association, despite
the schedule's nexus to the legal profession. s The Court did not,
however, foreclose the possibility that it would impose less strin-
gent antitrust liability on professionals.1 87 Certain features of pro-
fessions might justify validating a restraint on professional activity
that would be invalid if applied in other trades.'" The public ser-
vice aspect of professions was the only feature identified by the
Goldfarb Court as perhaps justifying an otherwise impermissible
restraint. 19
In subsequent decisions, the Supreme Court continued to inti-
mate, but has failed to apply, a more lenient antitrust standard for
professions. In National Society of Professional Engineers v.
United States,'" the Court invalidated a canon of engineering eth-
ics that prohibited competitive bidding. Although the Court did
not deem the canon to be price fixing, it nonetheless held it to be
per se illegal.' 4 ' The Court found the canon inherently unreason-
able because it completely precluded price competition among en-
gineers." 2 The Society argued that the canon should be upheld
under Goldfarb because competitive bidding would lead to decep-
tively low bids, and would thereby tempt engineers to do inferior
work with consequent risk to public safety and health." 8 The
Court rejected this argument, holding that an ethical canon that
merely regulates competition might be permissible under Goldfarb,
but one that completely forecloses competition cannot be
135. 421 U.S. 773, 787 (1975).
136. Id. at 792-93.
137. Id. at 788-89 n.17. The Court stated:
The fact that a restraint operates upon a profession as distinguished from a
business is, of course, relevant in determining whether that particular restraint
violates the Sherman Act. It would be unrealistic to view the practice of profes-
sions as interchangeable with other business activities, and automatically to ap-
ply to the professions antitrust concepts which originated in other areas. The
public service aspect, and other features of the professions, may require that a
particular practice, which could properly be viewed as a violation of the Sher-
man Act in another context, be treated differently. We intimate no view on any




140. 435 U.S. 679 (1978).
141. Id. at 692.
142. Id. at 696.




Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Society 45 is the most
recent Supreme Court decision involving the application of the an-
titrust laws to a profession. In Maricopa a plurality of the Court
refused to withhold the application of the per se rule against a
price-fixing agreement merely because the agreement was imple-
mented by doctors, rather than nonprofessionals.14" The State of
Arizona had challenged the agreement among competing physi-
cians that set the maximum fees for medical services provided
under certain insurance plans.147 Participating physicians were free
to charge less than the maximum fee for services they provided to
policyholders, and were not restricted in the fees they could charge
to non-policyholders." 48 Policyholders could retain the services of
any physician, but were not reimbursed for fees in excess of the
maximum scheduled fee.
1 49
In reversing the decision of the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Ninth Circuit, the Supreme Court held this fee
scheme to be a price-fixing agreement and hence per se illegal. 50
The per se rule could not be avoided merely by showing that a
profession was involved:
In Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, we stated that the "public
service aspect, and other features of the professions, may require
that a particular practice, which could properly be viewed as a
violation of the Sherman Act in another context, be treated dif-
ferently." The price fixing agreements in this case, however, are
not premised on public service or ethical norms. The respon-
dents do not argue. .. that the quality of the professional ser-
vice that their members provide is enhanced by the price
restraint."'
Thus, the Court implied that a different conclusion might result
when a restraint imposed by professionals is premised upon public
service or ethical norms. 15
144. Id. at 696.
145. 102 S. Ct. 2466 (1982) (plurality opinion).
146. Id. at 2475.
147. Id. at 2469-72.
148. Id. at 2471.
149. Id. at 2471-72.
150. Id. at 2472-75.
151. Id. at 2475 (citations omitted).
152. In addition to refusing to apply a professional exemption to the per se rule, the
Court refused to withhold application of the per se rule merely because the Court has had
little antitrust experience in the health care field. Id. at 2476. Such an exception, the Court
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Goldfarb, Professional Engineers, and Maricopa all indicate
that the antitrust laws may be applied less rigorously to profes-
sions than to other trades. The rule emerging from these cases may
be interpreted in two different ways. One interpretation is that a
restraint imposed by a profession cannot obviate the application of
the per se rule, but can only serve as one factor to be considered in
rule of reason cases. Under this interpretation, a denial of staff
privileges that constitutes a group boycott would not be saved by
the professional qualification to antitrust liability.153
A second interpretation of Goldfarb and its progeny is that a
restraint imposed by professionals will be saved from the per se
rule only if it is solidly grounded on the public service aspects of
the profession. 15 ' Additionally, the restraint must merely regulate,
not totally foreclose competition.' 5' This alternative interpretation
might justify the application of the rule of reason, rather than the
per se rule, to staff privilege cases. Some restraints on staff privi-
leges are necessary to ensure that physicians are competent and to
enable hospitals to limit their liability for physicians' errors. Staff
privileges merely regulate competition by fostering competent
medical care by qualified physicians. Unlike the ban on competi-
tive bidding in Professional Engineers,"' professional competency
reviews will not entirely foreclose competition among physicians. 15
It is not yet clear whether the emerging professional qualifica-
tion to antitrust liability will result in the application of the rule of
reason to denials of staff privileges. If the qualification does pre-
clude application of the per se rule, the resulting rule of reason
analysis will be identical to the analysis warranted by the Silver
self-regulation exception."' s
noted, would frustrate the rationale of the per se rule, "which in part is to avoid 'the neces-
sity for an incredibly complicated and prolonged economic investigation into the entire his-
tory of the industry involved . . . in an effort to determine at large whether a particular
restraint has been unreasonable .... .' Id. at 2476-77 (quoting Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v.
United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958)).
153. The denial, however, would nonetheless be analyzed under the rule of reason if the
self-regulatory criteria set forth in Silver are satisfied. See supra text accompanying notes
115-30.
154. See Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 787 n.17 (1976).
155. National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 696 (1978).
156. Id.
157. Certain denials, however, may effectively foreclose competition and should there-
fore be subject to the per se rule. For example, when the practice of a hospital is to deny
staff privileges to all new doctors or doctors of a particular specialty, existing staff members
may be totally shielded from competition.
158. See supra text accompanying notes 115-30.
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D. Denials of Staff Privileges and the Rule of Reason
In analyzing whether a restraint is legal under the rule of rea-
son, courts examine the market power of the conspirators, and the
purpose and effect of the restraint to determine if it substantially
impedes competition. Market power plus anticompetitive purpose
or effect may be sufficient for the restraint to be held illegal under
the rule of reason.1
In denial of staff privilege cases, there are two types of market
power. First, the competitors of the excluded physician may have
sufficient market power to coerce the hospital into excluding the
applicant.160 Second, the hospital may have sufficient market
power to effectively deprive the excluded physician from access to
a resource essential to the practice of medicine."' Although there
may be more than one hospital in the relevant geographic market,
excluding a physician from one hospital often leads to exclusion
from other hospitals.1"2 Moreover, exclusion by one hospital may
lead to disciplinary investigation by local medical boards and thus
further impede an excluded physician's ability to practice
medicine.163 Although many instances of denial or revocation of
staff privileges involve the exercise of market power, anticompeti-
tive purpose or effect must also exist before the denial of staff priv-
ileges is invalidated under the rule of reason.
The purpose and effect of the revocation or denial of staff
privileges may be anticompetitive. For example, an individual may
be refused privileges because he did not join a medical society or
because the current staff members desire to be insulated from ad-
ditional competition. But hospitals may also have legitimate pur-
poses for denying or revoking staff privileges. First, hospitals may
be liable for the acts of their staff physicians and thus must exer-
cise control over who has staff privileges to limit that liability.'
159. See United States v. Container Corp. of Am., 393 U.S. 333 (1969). In contrast,
purpose or effect may be sufficient to find a violation of § 1 of the Sherman Act under a per
s analysis even in the absence of market power. See United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil
Co., 310 U.S. 150, 224 n.59 (1940); L. SULLIVAN, supra note 47, at 192.
160. See Fashion Originators' Guild of Am. v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457, 462 (1941).
161. See United States v. General Motors Corp., 384 U.S. 127, 145-46 (1966); Klor's,
Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, 359 U.S. 207, 210-11 (1959).
162. Grad, The Antitrust Laws and Professional Discipline in Medicine, 1978 DUKE
L.J. 443. "The non-renewal or revocation of privileges may have far-reaching consequences
for a physician, because no other hospital in the area is likely to grant him privileges either,
and his record may follow him elsewhere if he tries to relocate." Id. at 469-70.
163. F. GRAD & N. MARTI, A STUDY OF MEDICAL DISCIPLINARY PROCEDURES 225, 227
n.614 (1978); Grad, supra note 162, at 471.
164. See Darling v. Charleston Community Memorial Hosp., 33 Ill. 2d 326, 211 N.E.2d
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Without the ability to revoke or deny staff privileges based on
qualifications, hospitals would have to continually monitor the
competence of their staff physicians. Such review would impose
greater costs upon hospitals than periodic review. Second, prohib-
iting hospitals from exercising discretion over the number of staff
members might lead to inefficiencies resulting from an excessively
large staff. Finally, a hospital has a legitimate interest in prevent-
ing physician incompetence to ensure public confidence in the in-
tegrity of the health care provided at that particular hospital.
In analyzing the power, purpose, and effect of any denial of
staff privileges, the procedural requirements of Silver will be perti-
nent. The requirements of notice and a hearing will provide some
indicia of the possible legitimate motives for a revocation or denial
of staff privileges. 1 5 If it appears that the true motive for the de-
nial of privileges was not anticompetitive, then the denial should
be allowed. But the denial of staff privileges should be violative of
section 1 of the Sherman Act when the purpose or effect of the
denial is anticompetitive and there is some evidence of market
power.
The application of the rule of reason in this manner will serve
to inhibit many of the restraints confronting physicians attempting
to gain access to hospital facilities. The rule of reason is, neverthe-
less, flexible enough to permit hospitals to exercise their legal obli-
gation to maintain some control over their medical staffs.
V. CONCLUSION
Hospital governing boards have come under increasing legal
pressure to ensure that their staff physicians are competent. To
carry out that obligation, governing boards of hospitals have had to
rely on the expert advice of their staff physicians. This practice,
however, is fraught with antitrust problems because it may consti-
tute a concerted refusal to deal.
Concerted refusals to deal involving conspiracies among com-
petitiors to exclude other competitors usually have been held to be
per se illegal. Although per se rules in general, and per se rules
applied to concerted refusals to deal in particular, have been se-
verely criticized, the Supreme Court has not reviewed recently the
per se rule as applied to concerted refusals to deal. The Court has,
253 (1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 946 (1966).
165. See Silver v. New York Stock Exch., 373 U.S. 341 (1963); supra text accompanying
notes 115-30.
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however, carved out an exception to the rule for concerted refusals
to deal adopted as legitimate means of self-regulation.
Concerted refusals to deal arising out of the denial or revoca-
tion of staff privileges appear to fall within this exception when the
hospital has implemented procedural safeguards, such as giving the
applicant notice and an opportunity to be heard. If such safe-
guards are provided, the antitrust legality of the denial is tested
under the rule of reason. Under this flexible test, courts will be
able to analyze the coercive power of the conspirators and the an-
ticompetitive purpose and effect of the denial, striking down the
denial of staff privileges only if those anticompetitive considera-
tions outweigh the hospital's legitimate interest in maintaining a
competent staff. Such an approach should effectively serve to bal-
ance the conflicting interests of physicians and hospitals while up-
holding the purposes of the antitrust laws.
